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Previous research has found that on-farm income variability helps determine off-farm labor 
supply.  However, unobserved heterogeneity of farms or regions may have biased earlier results. 
In this study, we use an exogenous increase in Federal crop insurance subsidies as a natural 
experiment to identify the importance of risk in off-farm labor supply. The subsidy increases 
induced greater participation in crop insurance programs and thereby reduced farmers' financial 
risks. By merging county-level crop insurance participation data with farm-level Agricultural 
Census data from 1992 and 1997 we can compare the off-farm labor decisions of individual 
farms before and after the subsidy and thereby control for unobserved heterogeneity. Unlike 
previous studies, we find that on-farm risk does not affect the labor allocation decisions of farm 
households. 
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1.  Introduction 
The standard model of off-farm labor supply maintains that risk-neutral agents allocate their 
endowment of labor to the farm and labor market so as to equate the value marginal product of 
labor on-farm with the wage rate off-farm (e.g., Kerachsky, 1977; Sumner, 1982).  Empirical 
analyses of off-farm labor supply usually involve estimating a reduced form supply equation in 
which off-farm labor (total household or operator and spouse separately) is a function of wages, 
prices, and characteristics of the utility and production functions (Goodwin and Holt, 2002; 
Howard and Swidinsky, 2000; Lass and Gempesaw, 1992; Huffman and Lange, 1989; Sumner, 
1982; Huffman, 1980). 
If farmers are risk-averse, then an increase in the variation of returns to labor lowers the 
certainty equivalent wage.  Mishra and Goodwin (1997) show that an increase in the variation of 
on-farm income causes farmers with constant absolute risk aversion to increase labor supplied 
off-farm. In general, however, the off-farm labor response to on-farm income risk is ambiguous: 
with increasing absolute risk aversion, an increase in the variation of on-farm income risk may 
reduce labor supplied off-farm (Fabella, 1989; Hartwick, 2000). 
There have been several empirical investigations of the relationship between on-farm risk 
and off-farm labor supply, all of which have tested whether measures of on-farm income 
variability help explain off-farm labor supply.  Mishra and Goodwin (1997) estimate 
simultaneous Tobit equations for farm operator and spouse’s supply of off-farm labor.  Based on 
a cross-sectional sample of Kansas farms, they find that the coefficient of variation of gross farm 
income is a significant determinant of the operator’s (but not the spouse’s) supply of off-farm 
labor.  In a second paper, Mishra and Goodwin (1998) estimate an off-farm labor supply 
equation using county-level panel data from two states.  They find that that the coefficient of 
variation of farm income has a significant and positive effect on off-farm labor supply in both 
states. Kanwar (2000) uses panel data on farms in India to estimate a two-stage labor supply 
model.  The first stage explains the operator’s decision whether to supply labor off-farm, and the 
second stage explains the quantity of labor to supply, conditional on market participation.     3
Kanwar finds that standard deviation of net returns is positive and significant in the first stage, 
but not in the second. 
Two major differences distinguish our study from previous work. First, previous studies 
use estimates of income variation to measure risk.  To some extent, however, income variation is 
endogenous: farmers can adjust their income variation by altering their crop mix, applications of 
fertilizer and pesticides, machinery investment, labor allocation, or location.  If a farmer’s 
environment becomes riskier (e.g., prices or yields become more stable or crop insurance 
becomes cheaper) then a farmer may alter his behavior to maintain the same variation in income 
or output.  Because income variation is endogenous, estimates of the relationship between 
income variation and labor allocation may be biased.  Our approach is to examine how farmers’ 
labor allocation decision (to work on or off the farm) changes in response to an exogenous 
change in the costs of bearing risk (caused by a large exogenous increase in insurance premium 
subsidies). 
Second, in the earlier studies using cross-sectional data or panel data with no individual 
fixed effects, unobserved heterogeneity of both farms and regions might have biased the results.  
For example, unobserved factors that could affect the off-farm labor supply decision include the 
type of crop grown, the share of land allocated to each particular cropping activity (rather than 
just total farm size), the level of irrigation, climate, and agricultural and labor market 
characteristics.  Because variation in farm income may be correlated with these unobservable 
factors, income risk may be spuriously correlated with off-farm labor supply. 
To illustrate, consider two observationally identical farms where each farm’s operator 
earns the same expected on-farm income.  Unobservable to the econometrician, one farm grows 
a crop with little revenue variability that requires a lot of labor to produce, while a second farm 
grows a crop with greater revenue variability that requires less labor to produce (both crops 
provide the same expected income so presumably the labor-intensive crop uses fewer non-labor 
inputs).  If the farmers are risk neutral, then the farmer of the risky crop should supply more 
labor off-farm, simply because the crop is less labor-intensive.  In this case, the observed   4
correlation between on-farm income risk and off-farm labor supply is spurious.  Hence, methods 
that do not control for all the factors correlated with labor supply (which is often impossible in a 
cross-sectional analysis, since many factors are unobservable) may falsely attribute off-farm 
labor supply to the riskiness of farm income. 
One way to control for unobserved individual heterogeneity is to examine differences in 
labor supply by the same farmers across time.  In this study, we use an exogenous policy change 
as a natural experiment to identify the importance of risk in off-farm labor supply.  In 1994, the 
Federal government passed the Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act (FCIRA), which markedly 
increased subsidies for premiums paid in crop insurance – fully subsidizing low levels of 
insurance (Catastrophic Insurance) and partially subsidizing higher levels of insurance.   
Congress passed FCIRA in an attempt to provide a risk management tool for farmers while 
weaning them off their reliance on ad-hoc disaster assistance packages.  These subsidies induced 
greater participation in crop insurance programs and thereby reduced some farmers' financial 
risks. By comparing changes over time in the off-farm labor supply of farms that faced different 
levels of insurance subsidies before and after the policy change, we can observe whether changes 
in farm income risk affect off-farm labor supply, holding factors common to the farm household 
constant. 
Data for the study originate from several sources.  Information on farm labor allocation 
and farm characteristics is from the farm-level Agricultural Census for 1992 and 1997.  We 
combine this information with county-level data on crop insurance participation from the Risk 
Management Agency of the USDA, unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
and average wage rates from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Unlike previous studies, we find 
that changes in the risk faced by farm households have no significant effect on the labor supply 
decisions of these households.   The findings suggest that programs that reduce grower risk, such 
as crop or revenue insurance, may have few implications for farm household labor allocation 
decisions. 
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2. Methods 
In this study, we examine how off-farm labor supply changed following a large 1995 increase in 
crop insurance subsidies.  These subsidies caused a large increase in insurance adoption 
(coverage per acre) that reduced the amount of risk faced by many farmers. We explore two 
empirical relationships between risk and off-farm labor: pooled cross-sectional time differences 
and difference in differences.   
For farm operator i in time t, the desired off farm labor supply 
*
it L  is assumed to be a 
function of factors  it X  that influence the propensity to supply labor off farm, and factors  it W  that 
influence the expected return to off-farm labor.
1  The propensity to supply off-farm labor may 
also depend on the operator’s per acre crop insurance coverage level  it C : 
 
(1)   it it it W it X it C W X L ε γ β β α + + + + =
* . 
 
We use per acre coverage rather than total coverage in (1) because total coverage is 
simultaneously determined with labor supply – total coverage (premium per acre times total 
acres) depends on farm size and farm size is closely related on-farm labor demand.  Hence we 
would expect a negative relationship between total coverage and off-farm labor supply regardless 
of whether risk influences labor supply.    
The “continuous” variable, desired off-farm labor supply, is double-censored: on the left 
at zero, and on the right at the maximum possible number of workdays per year, 225.
 Census 
respondents could report that the number of days they worked off farm were 0, 1-49, 50-99, 100-
149, 150-199, or more than 199.  We assigned the midpoint of each interval as the observed 
number of days, with 225 being the midpoint of the top category.   Hence, we observe: 
 
                                                 
1  The farm operator’s off-farm labor supply may be a joint decision with his or her spouse. However, we 
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We could estimate parameters associated with the pooled cross-sectional relationship given by 
(1) and (2) using maximum likelihood methods.   
    
Identification based on time difference 
One problem with estimating (1) and (2) is that in any one time period, per-acre coverage 
is endogenous – farms make their labor allocation decisions and insurance coverage decisions 
simultaneously – so that a relationship between the two may not be causal.  However, we can 
exploit the large increase in the coverage per acre between 1992 and 1997 that was caused by an 
exogenous policy change. Because the change in coverage per acre over time was large, a 
sizeable portion of the variation in coverage per acre in a pooled cross-section will be due to the 
policy change.  We could therefore estimate the following relationship: 
 





it L  is censored as before in (2) and where  t Y  is a dummy variable equal to one in 1997 
and zero in 1992.  If the crop insurance policy change was the only aggregate change affecting 
farm labor decisions that occurred between 1992 and 1997, then the parameter on the year 
dummy would provide an estimate of the average effect of the increase in the insurance subsidy 
on off-farm labor.   
 
Identification based on difference in differences 
It could be that unobserved aggregate factors caused off-farm labor supply to change 
between our sample years. To address this issue, we make use of a second source of   7
identification: different growth rates in insurance coverage across crops and farms induced by 
FCIRA.  Specifically, we estimate the average change in labor supply of individual farms 
between periods in response to changes in the exogenous variables X and W and to changes in 
their coverage levels. Subtracting the first time period (t = 0) from the second (t = 1), we have: 
 
(4)   it i i W i X i C W X L ε γ β β α + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ ~ ~ ~ ~ * . 
 
The censoring is now more complicated as the dependent variable is a difference of a 
double censored variable. The desired difference in labor supplied off-farm 
*
it L ∆  is censored 
depending on the censoring of the desired off farm labor in time zero 
*
0 i L  and time one 
*
1 i L .  That 
is, we observe: 
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Note that the desired difference in labor supplied off-farm is censored unless the farm operator’s 
desired supply of labor is uncensored in both periods.  If the operator supplies no labor in both 
periods, or supplies the maximum possible in both periods, then the desired  change in the 
quantity supplied cannot be observed.  If the desired supply of off-farm labor is censored in 
either period, then the desired change in supply is censored at the level of observed change in the 
supply  0 1 i i L L − . The censoring will either be right censored (if  0 > ∆ i L ) or left censored (if 
0 < ∆ i L ).
2 
                                                 
2  For example, if  0 i L  = 0 and  1 i L  = 25, then 
*
i L ∆  is right censored at 25. If  0 i L  = 25 and  1 i L  = 0, then 
*
i L ∆  is left censored at -25.  
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In addition to controlling for aggregate changes that affected the labor supply of farms, 
differencing also controls for omitted variable bias.  To illustrate, suppose the error term in (1) 
contains time invariant factors that are correlated with the regressors:  it i it v u + = ε .  These 
unobservable factors may include prices of inputs and outputs, specific features and locations of 
the land on which the farms are situated such as soil types and climate, and characteristics and 
preferences of the farm operators.  If the omitted variables are correlated with the regressors then 
OLS estimates of (1) will be biased. For example, the labor intensity of the crops grown may be 
positively correlated with coverage levels, which results in an inverse correlation between 
coverage and off-farm labor, causing γ  to be biased downward.  After differencing, the error no 
longer contains  i u  so there is no longer correlation between the regressors and the error term.
3 
Estimation of the difference equation (3) takes advantage of an identifiable, exogenous 
source of variation in coverage – the FCIRA caused insurance coverage to increase more for 
some crops and regions than for other crops and regions. In general, we find a negative 
correlation between the level of coverage prior to FCIRA and the growth in coverage following 
FCIRA.  This relationship makes sense: farmers who were already insured did not have to 
change their behavior to obtain the newly increased insurance subsidies.  But those who were not 
previously insured had to adopt insurance in order to obtain them.  
The parameter γ ~ is an unbiased estimate of the effect of the insurance policy change so 
long as factors correlated with the change in insurance coverage did not simultaneously alter 
crop insurance decisions.  In fact, around the same time as FCIRA, another policy change 
occurred that might have been correlated with insurance coverage.  The 1996 Federal 
Agricultural Improvement Reform Act (FAIR) dramatically altered the structure of agricultural 
income support payments.  This Act, sometimes called the “freedom to farm bill,” decoupled 
most payments from farmers’ current planting decisions.  Prior to FAIR, most government 
                                                 
3 As an alternative to differencing, one can include fixed effects for each farm in equation 1.  Due to the 
large number of farms in our sample and the non-linear statistical methods that we employ, this approach 
was computationally infeasible.   9
payments to farmers were tied to commodity prices, and farmers were required to limit current 
plantings to a share of historical plantings to qualify for payments.  The FAIR Act lifted nearly 
all planting restrictions and decoupled payments from price levels.  In effect, the Act scheduled 
lump-sum payments to land units based on pre-Act participation in government farm programs.  
If the Act caused changes in off-farm labor decisions in a way correlated with changes in 
insurance coverage, it could bias our estimates. 
  To control for the effects of the FAIR Act, we include each farm’s level of 1997 
government farm payments as an explanatory variable in the vector  it X .
4  The level of these 
payments was determined in advance according to parameters laid out in the FAIR Act.  The 
larger these payments, the more a farm is engaged in pre-1996 farm programs, and the greater 
the effect of the policy change on income variability and insurance coverage, all else the same. 
 
3. Data  
Figure 1 shows total subsidies, total premiums, and total acres enrolled in the crop insurance 
program from 1990 to 1998.  The figure was constructed using county-level data obtained from 
the Risk Management Agency (RMA) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The figure shows 
the marked increase in crop insurance subsidies beginning in 1995, the season following the 
FCIRA of 1994.  We present separate plots for all crops and for the three largest individual crops 
(in acreage): corn, soybeans, and wheat.  In 1997 these three crops made up 78.9% of the acreage 
insured, 55.5% of the subsidies, and 51.7% of the total premiums paid.  As of 1997, these three 
crops also made up 53.8% of cultivated cropland in the U.S. (excluding hay). 
For each of the ten crops that account for the most in total premiums, table 1 reports 1992 
and 1997 levels of premiums, acres harvested, share of acres insured, premiums per acre 
harvested, premiums per insured acre, and subsidies per insured acre. These ten crops make up 
85% of the premiums paid in 1997.  The table illustrates the dramatic increase in premiums 
                                                 
4 We do not include Conservation Reserve Program payments in government payments.  In 1997, nearly 
all payments to farmers (net of conservation payments) were payments scheduled by the 1996 Act.   10
across most crops.  Some crops, however, increased more than others.  For barley, potatoes, and 
dry beans, premiums per acre harvested increased by about 1/3, whereas for wheat and sorghum 
the ratio increased by about ½, and for cotton, corn, soybeans the increase was almost 2/3.  The 
most extreme cases were peanuts, which showed little increase (the crop was heavily insured 
before the policy change), and tobacco, for which no federal crop insurance was available in 
1992. 
The data obtained from RMA are county population values for crop insurance 
enrollment.  These data, however, do not include information on production practices.  We 
obtained data on individual farm operations from the micro files of the 1992 and 1997 
Agricultural Censuses.
5  The Census micro files contain limited information about almost every 
farm operation in the U.S. and somewhat more detailed information, elicited in the “long form,” 
for about one third of farm operations, aimed more heavily at large farm operations than smaller 
ones. We then merged all Census records from 1992 and 1997 by farm operation to obtain a 
panel data set.  We restricted this data set to include all farms that received the long form in both 
1992 and 1997 and received more than $100,000 in sales in both 1992 and 1997.  Because large 
farms are more likely than small farms to receive the long form, these farms also are more likely 
to receive the long form in two consecutive censuses. 
 
Insurance coverage 
We construct a measure of the insurance coverage based on total premiums paid for the 
insurance. The premium includes the farmer’s contribution plus the government subsidy, and 
should equal the premium that would be charged by a private insurance provider.  The estimated 
total “coverage”  ikt p  for farm i located in county k at time t is:  
 
                                                 
5 These data are confidential, so we were required to perform our statistical analysis on site at the data 
laboratory of the National Agricultural Statistics Association (NASS) of the U.S. Department of 










where  jkt P  is the total premiums paid for crop j in county k at time t from RMA,  ijkt a  is farm i’s 
area planted in crop j in county k at time t from the Agricultural Census, and  ∑ =
i
ijkt jkt a a  is the 
total area planted in crop j in county k at time t.   
Although it may seem that farm level insurance data would be preferred over merging 
county-level insurance data with individual farms as described above, there are certain benefits 
to our approach.  Idiosyncratic variability of individual farm coverage changes that is correlated 
with idiosyncratic variability of changes in crop shares and or input applications could bias our 
regression estimates.  In using county-level coverage levels, proxied by the average premium per 
acre harvested, we limit our source of identification to between-county variation in growth rates, 
which should reduce biases of this kind.  In essence, county-level coverage changes serve as an 
instrument for farm-level changes. 
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the main variables used in the analysis for 1992 
and 1997.  There was a slight decline in the number of days worked off-farm. Some of this 
decline likely resulted from the fact that operators were five years older in the second period.  
Note that the average coverage per acre in the sample more than doubled from $2.97/acre in 
1992 to $7.05/acre in 1997.  The average change in total premiums paid was $5,987.7 
 
4. Results 
Table 3 presents the results of estimating (2) and (3) the double-censored cross-sectional analysis 
of the days of labor supplied off-farm with the year dummy variable. The age of the operator is 
very significant in explaining the number of days supplied off-farm.   Younger operators supply 
more labor off-farm than do older operators.  For example, farmers younger than 30 years supply 
78.9 more days off-farm compared to farmers over 60 years (the omitted category “agecat5”). 
Wage is statistically significant in the regression and the estimated coefficient implies that an   12
increase of $1000 in the annual wage results in an additional 2.7 days supplied off-farm.  The 
unemployment rate is not significantly correlated with labor supply.   
  The year dummy variable is not significantly different from zero, which implies that the 
there was no significant average change in the quantity of labor supplied off-farm between 1992 
and 1997 after controlling for local wages and unemployment rates.  Moreover, the standard 
error of the year fixed effect is small.  Despite the large increase in insurance coverage for these 
farms between 1992 and 1997, the 95% confidence interval for the change in off-farm labor 
between 1992 and 1997 is (-1.89, 0.69) days, all else the same. 
  Table 4 presents the estimates from three specifications of (4) and (5), the difference in 
differences regression. Out of a possible 22,334 difference observations, 18,552 of these farms 
had unobservable changes in their supply of off-farm labor for both periods (because they 
supplied no labor in both periods, or supplied all their labor in both periods), leaving us with 
only 5782 observations. Of these, only 1462 were not censored (the farm supplied between 0 and 
225 days of labor in both years), and the remaining were either left or right censored.   
   Explanatory variables in the first regression (column 1) include changes in the wages and 
unemployment rates, the age categories in 1992, the change in insurance coverage per acre, and 
government payments per acre in 1997.  As shown in the table, age is the only significant 
determinant of the change in labor supplied off-farm – being in one of the youngest three age 
categories is associated with an statistically significant increase in the supply of labor off-farm.  
The change in the wage, the change in the unemployment rates, the change in coverage per acre, 
and government payments per acre are not statistically significant.   
  The second difference in differences regression (column 2) includes controls for lagged 
cropland harvested, and lagged cropland harvested interacted with the change in coverage per 
acre – to allow the effect of a change in coverage per acre to vary with farm size.  The results of 
this regression are very similar to those in column 1.   
  The final regression (column 3) adds state fixed effects.  The test of the joint significance 
of these fixed effects reveals they improve the fit of the model.  After controlling for effects that   13
are common to the state in which the farms are located, the change in the unemployment rate 
now is a small but statistically significant determinant of off farm labor supply – an increase in 
the unemployment rate of 1% results in a decrease in labor supplied by 0.22 days. 
  For all three models’ specifications we find that changes in insurance coverage per acre 
were not statistically significant in explaining changes in labor supplied by individual operators.   
Furthermore, the standard errors for the estimated effects are very small. In all three difference 
regressions, the 95% confidence intervals for the change in days worked off farm induced by 
FCIRA, which increased total premiums in our sample by an average of almost $6,000 per farm, 
reflecting an increase in adopted insurance, lie in the range (-0.36, 0.33) days per year.  Hence, 
the evidence strongly suggests that risk does not affect farmers’ labor allocation decisions. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper used an exogenous increase in Federal crop insurance subsidies as a natural 
experiment to identify the importance of risk in off-farm labor supply. The crop insurance 
subsidy increase induced greater participation in crop insurance programs and consequently 
reduced some farmers' financial risks. By comparing changes over time in the off-farm labor 
supply of farms that faced different levels of insurance subsidies before and after the policy 
change, we observed whether changes in farm income risk affected off-farm labor supply, 
holding factors common to the farm household constant across time.  
  The study found that changes in crop insurance did not significantly influence the level of 
off-farm labor supply – either over time, as in the cross-section regression, or using the 
difference in differences regression that controls for time invariant heterogeneity.  These results 
contradict earlier studies that found that risk, measured by historical variation in farm income, 
was negatively related to off-farm labor supply.  It is possible that in earlier studies, using 
cross-sectional data or panel data with no individual fixed effects, unobserved heterogeneity of 
both farms and regions biased the results.     14
  We can elaborate on these preliminary results in future work.  One statistical concern is 
that changing prices or other unobserved factors besides FCIRA may have contributed to 
observed changes in crop insurance coverage.  For example, coverage changes may have been 
caused to some degree by changes in the farm’s crop mix, which depends on relative prices.  To 
the extent that these factors affected all farms they do not bias our difference regressions. If, 
however, these factors affected some farms’ crop-insurance adoption rates more than others, and 
the resulting pattern of adoption is correlated with the pattern of induced changes in off-farm 
labor, then our estimates could be biased. To eliminate possible biases we could include controls 
for prices and prices interacted with time-zero crop shares.  We might also instrument the 1992-
1997 change in the level of coverage with 1992 level of coverage.  The 1992 coverage level 
provides a suitable instrument because the increase in subsidies caused farmers with little or no 
insurance in 1992 to increase coverage more than farmers with higher levels of coverage in 1992. 
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Figure 1. Insurance coverage of all crops and largest individual crops in years preceding and 





Source: Risk Management Agency, at http://www.rma.usda.gov/data/ 
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Table 1. Insurance coverage before and after FCIRA of 1994 
 
 


























1992  1997  1992  1997 1992 1997  1992 1997 1992 1997 1992 1997 
Wheat  146,118  313,933  59,003  60,953  0.497  0.833 2.53 5.16 1.36 2.98 5.09  6.2 
Cotton  90,657 252,676 11,742  13,787 0.371  0.835  7.86  18.36  6.22  12.84  21.21  21.98 
Corn  196,412  460,662  68,905  70,371  0.327  0.702 2.87 6.55 2.23 4.18 8.78 9.34 
Dry Beans  13,326 25,136  1,159  1,530 0.628 0.848  11.57 16.47 5.15  9.56  18.43 19.42 
Sorghum  24,974  44,788  10,336  8,351  0.351  0.755 2.45 5.38 1.96 3.59 6.98 7.13 
Peanuts  39,840 36,153  1,354  1,292  0.78  0.914  29.54 28.01 8.77 13.67 37.86 30.63 
Soybeans  93,715  288,374  54,672  66,135  0.262  0.659 1.74 4.37 1.69 3.29 6.62 6.63 
Potatoes  12,497 28,857  905  1,107 0.326 0.626  15.91 26.52 11.68 23.55 48.73 42.35 
Barley  17,486  23,708  6,463 5,893  0.474  0.763 2.78 4.06 1.55 2.61 5.86 5.32 
Tobacco  0 31,768  783 806 0 0.826 0  68.66  0  31.17  0  83.15 
 
Source: Risk Management Agency at http://www.rma.usda.gov/data/  
   18




   1992    1997 
Variable Name  Definition  Mean  Std. Dev.    Mean  Std. Dev. 
           
daysoff  Number of days worked off-farm by operator.  
(midpoint of age-bracket on questionnaire) 
20.3444162 55.788414  19.902630 55.349636
wage  Average county annual wage per job (Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, December 2002) 
13181.89 2350.42  13538.97 2375.41 
agecat1  Age less than or equal to 30 years  0.1267095  0.3326532   0.0480635 0.2139042
agecat2  Age greater than 30 and less than 40 years  0.3147995  0.4644443   0.2477835 0.4317332
agecat3  Age greater than 40 and less than 50 years  0.2888833  0.4532517   0.3224452 0.4674207
agecat4  Age greater than 50 and less than 60 years  0.1928641  0.3945543   0.2540292 0.4353219
agecat5  Age greater than 60 years  0.0767436  0.2661890   0.1276787 0.3337377
uer  County unemployment rate (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics) 
6.6776501 2.9560608   4.9189324 2.6036093
totalcov_acre Estimated  premium  paid for insurance including 
government subsidies per acre – See text for details 
2.9676425 4.1036094   7.0505998 6.3337094
gov97  Total government payments in 1997, excluding 
Conservation Reserve Program payments 
18223.75 17114.41  18223.75 17114.41 
cropland_harv Cropland  harvested  (acres)  1179.25  805.24659   1346.14  946.95282
  
 
Source: All variables from the Census of Agriculture, 1992 and 1997, unless specified.  There were 48668 observations. 
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Table 3. Censored Regression – Pooled Cross Section with Year Dummy 
 
 
Variable Name  Estimate  Std. Err. 
  
Intercept 895.71944  1319.4 
Year-1997 dummy  -0.59886  0.66115 
wage  0.0026990  0.0006461 
agecat1  78.97771  7.46617 
agecat2  72.41579  6.29476 
agecat3  69.74501  6.22826 
agecat4  65.06487  6.17452 
uer -0.73444  0.55953 
  
 
Bold indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
Dependent Variable                  daysoff 
Number of Observations              48668 
Noncensored Values                     7207 
Right Censored Values                 2322 
Left Censored Values                 39139 
Log Likelihood                     -66963.47  20
Table 4. Censored Regression –  Difference in Differences under Three Alternative Specifications 
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Variable Name  Estimate  Std. Err.    Estimate Std.  Err.  Estimate Std.  Err. 
  
Intercept  -1.94204  0.43418  -1.75297  0.50542  -6.58697  5.76600 
d_wage  0.00008627 0.0001388   0.00008426 0.0001388   0.00004356 0.0001412 
agecat1  1.92464  0.57897  1.89946  0.58018  1.99694  0.57907 
agecat2  1.75883  0.43200  1.73644  0.43343  1.68116     0.43397 
agecat3  1.63820  0.42530  1.62237  0.42587  1.57135     0.42617 
agecat4  0.79130  0.44781    0.77669  0.44830    0.75356     0.44713 
d_uer  -0.06677 0.06855    -0.06466 0.06871    -0.22338     0.08297 
d_totalcov_acre 0.01339  0.02520   -0.0050769  0.03769   -0.0033677      0.04306 
gov97_acre  -0.0053469 0.0075197   -0.0060564 0.0075980   -0.0098019    0.0078172 
l_cropland_harv -  -   -0.0001503  0.0001930    0.00003585    0.0002015 
l_land_cov -  -    0.00002116  0.00003462    -9.6098  E-6  0.00003674 
state fixed effects  no      no      yes   
              
log  likelihood  -8472.69     -8472.37     -8425.53  
              
 
Bold indicates significance at the 1% level.  yes/no indicates whether model included state fixed effects. 
Dependent Variable                 d_daysoff 
Number of Observations                5782 
Noncensored Values                     1462 
Right Censored Values                 2014 
Left Censored Values                  2306 
 
 
 